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D o s s i e r
The drive for creativity remains dominant in 
our society as it underpins our desire for inno-
vation. We rely on creativity as the means to 
save us from ourselves by finding innovative 
solutions to otherwise intractable problems such 
as climate change. Creativity is thus essential to 
our survival as well as central to our economy. 
Indeed we now have the creative or cultural in-
dustries (Hesmondhalgh, 2002) with the creative 
classes being seen as the key economic resource 
(Florida, 2002). Creativity and innovation has 
become big business. But what is this creativity 
we speak of? And what makes it creative? As with 
most things, we recognize a thing as ‘this thing’ 
because it resembles something we are already 
know to be ‘one of those things’. Creativity is 
thus recognized as creativity because it looks, acts 
and appears to be creative – just like all the other 
creative acts that we’ve identified as such – but 
this doesn’t give us the genesis of the idea. This 
raises two important considerations. First, and 
fundamentally, it questions what we understand 
as creativity, which this paper answers by sug-
gesting an alternative conception that challenges 
our taken-for-granted understanding. Secondly, 
it behoves us to reflect on the consequences of 
the fashion for creativity and innovation, and 
its limitations. This paper will explore these 
concerns by drawing on the work of Gilles 
Deleuze. Firstly it will set out the context of the 
creative imperative that is all pervasive before 
addressing the Deleuzian approach to creativity 
and – more fundamentally – to the act of thin-
king itself. In doing so it will question what we 
mean by problems and how we can avoid what 
Deleuze would call ‘ready made’ problems. The 
paper will then reflect on the nature of creati-
vity of the so-called creativity and innovation in 
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capitalist society before concluding with some 
thoughts on what it may mean to become more 
creative.
Be the change!
There is a wealth of literature that promises to 
make individuals and organisations (more) crea-
tive (for example, Brabandere and Iny, 2013; de 
Bono, 2007, 2015; Gray, Brown and Macanufo, 
2010). Various techniques claim to enhance our 
creative potential, or assist us to work better in 
teams to produce more innovative ideas. The dis-
course of creativity is common and recognisable 
even if different techniques are adopted. The 
quote “Be the change that you wish to see in the 
world” attributed to Mahatma Gandhi has become 
truncated to the mantra ‘Be the change!’ which 
calls upon each and every one of us to be open 
to change and to be more creative in our lives 
(even if we’re not focused on achieving a ‘better’ 
world). A walk through any management section 
of an airport bookshop will reveal a vast array 
of ‘self-help’ type books that promise to make 
you more creative and to enhance the innovative 
potential in yourself or your organisation. 
The creative imperative extends beyond national 
and organizational boundaries. The European 
Union, for example, has a commitment to invest 
in the creative industries, in recognition of their 
economic role. This investment extends beyond 
financial support to include the facilitation 
of cross-border networking. The language of 
creativity thus forms a central part of the global 
neoliberal discourse, capturing what the Boston 
Consulting Group term “value creating growth”. 
The growing engagement with the challenges 
of climate change provide an example of the 
creative mantra. Faced with global eco-system 
disrupting conditions, efforts have been made to 
find creative and innovative responses to tackle 
the causes and effects of climate change. In the 
main these are designed to keep the Western way 
of living largely unchanged; creative solutions 
seek to find efficiencies or clever alternatives to 
enable us to continue living our lives much as 
we have done during the last few decades. The 
wealthier, Western nations dominate and are at the 
forefront of these developments1. In contrast the 
local responses of communities in less developed 
countries, based on tradition, trial and error and 
community engagement are no less ‘creative’ and 
yet receive comparatively little attention, possibly 
because they do not represent the big innovative 
solutions that can be packaged and sold world-
wide. Creativity has become commodified, and it 
has an image that we recognize. When the ‘how to 
be creative’ texts talk about ‘thinking outside the 
box’ and ‘questioning assumptions’ (e.g. Braban-
dere and Iny, 2013), they don’t mean questioning 
the assumptions of growth and value creation. 
In short, our understandings of creativity remain 
firmly imbedded within the discourse of capital.
The creative imperative seems to support the 
Schumpeterian notion of ‘creative destruction’. 
Schumpeter (1961) argued that economic change 
revolves around innovation, the acts of entre-
preneurs to facilitate innovation, and the market 
power that incentivized such behaviour. But the 
call to innovate, and the creative imperative in 
particular, has proliferated beyond significant 
shifts in the economic cycle to incorporate the 
comparatively unremarkable micro-level crea-
tive acts that may – ultimately – have very little 
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effect on society. The meaning of creation has 
become on the one hand less precisely defined 
(almost anything can be described as creative) 
and on the other it is ever more tied to the unit of 
capital. We measure the success of creativity and 
the imperative for innovation in capitalist terms: 
things, ideas are all units that can be sold or uti-
lized to create economic value. In short, there is 
nothing creative in the discourse of creativity. The 
‘changemakers’, ‘rule breakers’ and ‘paradigm 
shifting’ in management discourse are what De-
leuze would describe as a royal science in which 
the territory of our thought is limited to that in 
which it is grounded (in this case, capital) and 
which operates with perceived legitimacy: it is 
the established way of thinking. In contrast, to be 
truly creative and open to possibilities, we require 
an ‘untimely’ nature of thinking (Deleuze 1990: 
265), what Deleuze terms a ‘nomadic’ thought. 
This minor, or nomadic science thinks otherwise 
and outside the rules of the royal or state science 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004).
What is the alternative? What is difference?
For Deleuze creativity is not that which we 
recognize in its common understanding, but 
is a far more radical notion – a fundamentally 
different way of thinking. Whilst much of his 
consideration of what creativity is can be found 
in his collaboration with Guattari, What is Phi-
losophy? (specifically, creativity as the creation 
of concepts), the fundamental concern about 
thought is evident in Difference and Repetition, 
a text which tackles the nature of difference and 
what he describes as the problematic image of 
thought. This image is a concern for Deleuze 
as it limits us to certain ways of thinking and 
representing things and – crucially – fails to 
enable us to demonstrate genesis in thought, 
which conceals how philosophical thought relies 
on presuppositions. Creativity, transformation 
and evolution are central to Deleuze’s work. For 
Deleuze, creativity is central to life, and what he 
calls ‘becoming’. To understand his arguments it 
is therefore useful to explore some of his concepts 
which – following Deleuze’s notion that concepts 
should be used as ‘tools’ – will be utilized to set 
out how he conceptualizes creativity. Central to 
this discussion are his notions of difference and 
repetition, and his ambitions to develop a genetic 
account that sets out one of his key challenges to 
philosophical thinking, namely its representatio-
nal mode of thought.
Difference plays a critical role in Deleuze’s 
work. He understands difference as a process 
of individuation: ‘becoming’ that is particular 
and not general. His idea of difference stands in 
contrast to something being different from this or 
that (difference between this and another object). 
For Deleuze difference is ‘difference-in-itself’, a 
concept that does not rely on other objects with 
which it can be compared. It is a difference that is 
incomparable, for comparison suggests a shared 
basis upon which comparison could be made, 
and concerns things external to itself to enable 
a comparison. To compare suggests a degree of 
sameness to afford this measurement, and hints 
at the grouping of similar things, which in either 
case amounts to a form of generality or sameness. 
Instead, ‘difference-in-itself’ is unique in its par-
ticularity and becoming.  It relates to difference 
that is internal to the thing. This enables Deleuze 
to explore the differential field of intensity that 
gives us movement and becoming in multiple 
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ways, but that does not rely on something outside 
of itself. In doing so he lays the foundations for 
his genetic account that avoids presuppositions 
– individuation remains singular and unique and 
not based on a pre-existing identity. It is what 
Somers-Hall (2013: 23) describes as the “process 
of the emergence of form, which cannot be cap-
tured within the structure of the already formed”. 
What Deleuze challenges in his understanding of 
difference is the reliance of philosophy on resem-
blance, of representations in thought that lead us 
into certain ways of thinking about difference 
that rely on sameness to represent difference. As 
McMahon (2005: 43) puts it “the function of the 
concept of identity … is essentially that of “ma-
naging” difference. Thus for example, a concept 
subordinates differences by picking out qualities 
or things as “the same” or identical across (and 
despite) different cases”. 
In his second chapter in Difference and Repetition 
he investigates the notion of repetition, which he 
explores through reference to the likes of Kant, 
Hume, Bergson and Freud. For Deleuze repetition 
involves something that is the same (for it to be 
repetition) but that changes something in the mind 
that contemplates it (2004: 90). His seeks to deter-
mine whether it is possible to give an account of 
the organization of experience without relying on 
a subject to actively synthesise an understanding 
(as Kant does). This is important as the Kantian 
approach would prevent the concept of difference 
Deleuze wants to argue – it doesn’t allow us to 
look at the genesis of the subject as the subject 
is already given. Instead he relies on Hume and 
Bergson (and their work on habit and memory 
respectively) to explore a passive synthesis. 
Whilst Kant’s synthesis is an active synthesis, De-
leuze distinguishes the passive synthesis, which is 
responsible for bringing subjects into existence.
Deleuze draws on Hume and the repetition of a 
pattern: AB AB AB, A… where the second ‘AB’ 
is a “repeat”. In this case the repetition changes 
nothing in the object that repeats but changes 
something in the mind that contemplates it - it 
enables habit (when I see ‘A’ I expect ‘B’). Hume 
argues that this happens in the imagination and 
is a contractile power that creates a qualitative 
impression, but one that does not require unders-
tanding. This passive synthesis is not carried out 
by the mind even though it occurs in the mind 
and becomes a habit. This introduces time: we 
anticipate the future based on the past. Quali-
tative impressions are retained and anticipated 
accordingly and habit becomes the “constitutive 
root of the subject” (Deleuze, 1991: 63). Once 
the subject has emerged then, “on the basis of the 
qualitative impressions in the imagination me-
mory reconstitutes the particular cases as distinct 
… no longer the immediate past of retention but 
reflexive past of representation, of reflected and 
reproduced particularity” (Deleuze, 2004: 92), 
meaning an active synthesis of the Kantian kind. 
By starting with the passive synthesis Deleuze is 
able to avoid starting with a subject, and in doing 
so he achieves a genetic account, one that is not 
based on the presupposed subject. 
Repetition is therefore not the repeat of the same, 
but varies with each repetition, and what repeats 
is difference. As Parr (2005: 223) notes “repe-
tition is best understood in terms of discovery 
and experimentation; it allows new experiences, 
affects and expressions to emerge. To repeat is 
to begin again; to affirm the power of the new 
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and unforeseeable.” This destabilizes habit and 
creates something new. This affirmation of the 
power of the new and the understanding of pure 
difference contrasts with the regulated discourse 
of creativity and innovation, where innovations 
are categorized (by scale or type, for example), 
and creativity is often a structured process. Our 
understandings are always already captured by 
their form; classified and compared. As a conse-
quence, radical difference, or difference-in-itself, 
is always prevented. Instead, we operate on the 
territorialized plane which is occupied by a 
certain language and unit of measurement that 
subordinates difference in favour of recognizing 
sameness.
Challenging presuppositions
The work undertaken in the first two chapters of 
Difference and Repetition sets out the possibility 
for difference-in-itself that does not require a 
pre-given subject. It allows for a genetic ac-
count. Having set out this possibility he goes 
on to challenge the failures of the current ways 
of thinking that do not allow for the concept of 
difference(-in-itself). Current ways of philo-
sophical thought, Deleuze argues, leads us to 
an image of thought based on representation, 
relying on presuppositions about the nature of 
thought itself, that are not expressly discussed, 
but that are taken as ‘common sense’. Whilst 
common sense plays a useful role in everyday 
life, for ordering things, it is – Deleuze argues – 
problematic as a means of philosophy. Indeed it 
would make philosophy somewhat redundant as it 
would equate to common sense. Thought should, 
instead, be disruptive to common sense, it should 
question the form of thought. It shouldn’t take 
for granted this common sense or fail to question 
how this ‘order’ came to be (McMahon, 2005). 
In this sense it is both a philosophical and politi-
cal concern. These presuppositions are not only 
‘common’ but also ‘moral’ as Deleuze explains, 
drawing on Nietzsche, “because morality alone 
persuades us that thought has good nature and 
a thinker good will, and that only the good can 
ground the supposed affinity between thought and 
the true” (2004: 167). Yet Deleuze renounces this 
and argues not everyone is equally predisposed 
to this thinking nor should thought be considered 
universal to all thinkers. Further, it is the ones 
without good will who challenge presuppo-
sitions.
Somers-Hall (2013) argues that what Deleuze 
seeks to challenge is, firstly the systematic image 
of representation in thought, or that “Everybody 
knows, no one can deny2, is the form of repre-
sentation and the discourse of the representative” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 165). Secondly, he seeks to 
demonstrate how this representational mode is 
incapable of novelty (concepts may be created 
but they are formal but not real – the model 
doesn’t allow for the experimental philosophy 
that Deleuze wishes to achieve). And thirdly, that 
philosophy must begin with something outside 
thought – that is it requires something passive, 
as we have already discovered. “Once the good 
nature of thought has been assumed, philosophy 
becomes the systematic portrayal of a form of 
reason already implicitly present in common 
sense” (Somers-Hall, 2013: 103). For Deleuze, 
philosophy must act against this image. It must 
begin with something outside – an encoun-
ter, which must involve a passive notion of 
sensibility.
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Deleuze makes evident the tendency for ‘com-
mon sense’ to prevail. After all, who would be 
against common sense? But in explicating the 
meaning of ‘common’ he brings to our attention 
that its persuasive power should not be mistaken 
for truth. Our common understandings of crea-
tivity and innovation do not make them ‘better’ 
or ‘right’ and, crucially, they curtail the very 
possibility of their being creative. Common sense 
enables the ordering of everyday life, but it does 
not permit novelty; it works with what we know, 
not what we don’t know.
Recognition
Common sense, therefore, precludes the possi-
bility of the passive encounter. We can see this 
through the process of recognition, which De-
leuze understands as “the harmonious exercise 
of all the faculties upon a supposed same object” 
as he demonstrates, with references to Descartes: 
“wax remains wax, even as I put it by the fire” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 169). He goes on to explain that 
whilst each of the faculties (such as perception, 
memory, imagination, understanding and so on) 
acts differently, the object is recognized when 
the faculties relate it to a form of identity. Re-
cognition thus relies on a subjective principle of 
faculty collaboration for ‘everyone’ (common-
sense), and upon the unity of the thinking subject 
(Cogito), whose senses collaborate (in common) 
to recognize the object (ibid: 169). What this tells 
us is that the unity of the object (for the faculties) 
is given by the subject – the subject unifies the va-
rious properties into a coherent object. We judge 
something to be this or that object when the sense 
impressions accord (and we can therefore equally 
misrecognize something on this basis (Somers-
Hall, 2013: 106-7)). While common sense crosses 
faculties of the Self, good sense allows this to be 
distributed, or as Williams (2003: 117) puts it, 
“for a thought to be in principle shareable and 
good, it must be able to unify both within each 
individual thinker, and between thinkers”. 
Although common and good sense are formally 
empty (recognition is a process without prior 
content) we make presuppositions in a general 
way; that is we exclude things that we do not 
recognize. It presupposes the way of thinking. 
It compares the new to what we already know. 
“Recognition discounts the new as pure difference 
… because recognition must operate by breaking 
down difference into that which has already been 
recognised” (Williams, 2003: 119). Or as De-
leuze puts it: “The form of recognition has never 
sanctioned anything but the recognizable and 
the recognized; form will never inspire anything 
but conformities” (Deleuze, 2004: 170). The 
dogmatic approach to philosophical thinking, 
Deleuze argues, is that of recognition. But it is not 
only the object that is recognized, “but also the 
values attached to an object” (which are linked 
to good sense) (ibid: 171). As a consequence 
thought “rediscovers” the State, the Church, and 
“all the current values that it subtly presented in 
the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified 
eternal object” (ibid: 172). Here we can see the 
politics of Deleuze’s understanding of the limi-
tations of the model of thought as recognition. 
He argues that our “struggles” that occur on the 
basis of common sense and established values 
are then forever seeking to achieve the “current 
values (honours, wealth and power)” (ibid: 172). 
“Newness” is therefore always limited to being 
within this form and within these values.
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The model of recognition outlined relies upon 
representation. Deleuze outlines four elements 
that define representation. Firstly, in order to 
recognize something we must have a representa-
tion in the form of an identity. This is the identity 
of the concept. Secondly, the determination of 
the concept requires opposition (something is 
/ is not) for the memory and imagination to re-
discover whether something is an instance of a 
certain type. Thirdly, analogy acts as the basis of 
judgement, to determine a similarity between the 
properties. Fourthly it relies upon resemblance 
and similarity to enable perceptual continuity 
between the object and the memory of it. To-
gether, these four “fetters under which only that 
which is identical, similar, analogous or opposed 
can be considered different: difference becomes 
an object of representation always in relation 
to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an 
imagined opposition or a perceived similitude”. 
(Deleuze, 2004: 174). As a consequence thought 
isn’t able to conceive of difference-in-itself, 
and we are unable to grasp the intensities of 
creative repetition and pure difference (Williams, 
2003). 
Recognition, therefore, limits us to what we 
already know (or recognize), or forces us to 
reduce our ideas to something that becomes reco-
gnisable. The creative potential of innovation is 
therefore restricted to a form that conforms rather 
than breaks the mould in unforeseeable ways. 
The connection with values helps us understand 
that this is not politically neutral. What we (re)
produce is already given to us. Our struggles for 
new territory are always already territorialized 
by current values and ways of being – creativity 
and innovation is captured by capital.
Putting thinking into thought – rethinking 
problems.
“Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the 
enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: 
everything begins with misosophy. Do not count 
upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of 
what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency 
of an encounter with that which forces thought 
to raise up and educate the absolute necessity 
of an act of thought or a passion to think. The 
conditions of a true critique and a true creation 
are the same: the destruction of an image of 
thought which presupposes itself and the genesis 
of the act of thinking in thought itself.” (Deleuze, 
2004: 175-176)
“To think is to create – there is no other creation – 
but to create is first of all to engender “thinking” 
in thought.” (Deleuze, 2004: 185)
What forces us to think isn’t the object of re-
cognition but of a fundamental encounter that 
can only be sensed. In this way it is opposed to 
recognition where the sensible is not only sense 
but also that which is recalled, imagined, or 
conceived – the other faculties in a common sense 
(Deleuze, 2004: 176). Deleuze describes the ob-
ject of the encounter as a sign, but a sign that is 
imperceptible in terms of recognition, it can only 
be sensed. A sign that is imperceptible to these 
other faculties brings us to a limit. This sensed-
only sign “perplexes” – it poses a problem. The 
problem goes beyond that which may be stored 
in the memory in terms of past problems, and 
solutions. There is no ‘ready made’ answer and 
consequently it forces us to think in new ways. It 
is transformative and experimental. Deleuze prio-
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ritises the sensibility that sets things in motion.
This raises questions, for Deleuze, regarding the 
nature of a problem. His concern is that problems 
are currently merely reformulated propositions. 
Firstly, this leads us to think problems are given 
‘ready made’ and that consequently they disap-
pear in the solution. Secondly, this leads to a 
belief that the activity of thinking, and the search 
for the ‘truth’, starts with the search for solutions 
and that solutions are the only concern. Thirdly, 
it means that the problems are set from outside, 
or as Deleuze puts it: “the master sets a problem, 
our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited 
true or false by a powerful authority” (Deleuze, 
2004: 197).
Deleuze’s idea of a problem is different to that 
of Aristotle’s propositions. As Williams (2003) 
explains, problems are not the cognitive and logi-
cal problems of Aristotle. They are not problems 
to be ‘solved’. Instead they illuminate or give 
insight into aspects of a problem, but proffer no 
final answer. The answers to the questions shed 
light on the problem in particular ways. Instead, 
rather than solutions being thought of as true or 
false, it is problems that should be considered as 
true or false. As Deleuze outlines, a false problem 
is one that is indeterminate (such that no solution 
is possible) or overdetermined (such that a true or 
false solution is possible) (Deleuze, 2004: 198). 
Non-propositional problems, therefore arise from 
the act of thought (of the genetic, Deleuzian kind) 
– they are constructed, not ready made (Deleuze, 
2004: 197).
But in the image of thought, problems are judged 
through common opinion “accepted by all men” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 199). They are therefore the 
propositions of common sense, and remain 
evaluated by their ability to provide a solution. 
Consequently they miss the internal character of 
the problem, which are “the differential elements 
in thought” (ibid: 201). This differential element 
of problems “connects things to their conditions, 
both actual and virtual. It creates new concepts 
that allow for the conditions to be expressed 
with as much intensity as possible” (Williams, 
2003: 132). Problems are fluid, and each solution 
changes the nature of the problem. Underlying 
which is the idea of difference-in-itself found 
in repetition. 
More practically, Deleuze reflects on what this 
means for learning. For Deleuze, learning isn’t 
about the acquisition of knowledge but is about an 
engagement with problems. For Deleuze, the goal 
of learning is learning. By contrast, the image of 
thought trains thinkers through ‘method’ leading 
to the manifestation of common sense. Instead, 
Deleuze argues, we require an experimental 
approach to learning, one that doesn’t have the 
collection of a stock of knowledge as its aim 
(even though we will, of course, learn something 
in the process). This treatment of knowledge as 
a by-product, rather than a goal stands in sharp 
contrast to most of our ambitions for knowledge 
building.
In essence, Deleuze challenges the premise of our 
mode of thinking by demonstrating its limitations 
and presuppositions. He clearly recognizes why 
this image of thought is compelling, and thus how 
it has territorialized our thinking. His ‘untimely’ 
philosophy recognizes that he stands outside the 
dominant way of thinking. But his approach raises 
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considerable challenges for our understanding 
and approach to creativity and innovation. In re-
cognizing creativity we lose the very creativeness 
it claims for itself; its very recognisability means 
that it is something known, given to us in good 
and common sense. It eschews a transformative or 
experimental mode of becoming; it even bypasses 
the radical change assumed by the classic notions 
of creativity and innovation, such as those of 
Schumpeter. This change may, in part, be due to 
the hyperinflation of the meaning of creativity (in 
which anything can be considered creative) but 
also to a sense that we have mistaken or require 
a more critical engagement with what it means 
to be creative.
Creativity and its (destructive) consequences
For Deleuze, both creativity and its destructive 
effects are inevitable. The impossibility of re-
peating the same moment and the inevitability 
of repetition giving rise to difference attests to 
this. In repetition we have the possibility of rein-
vention – it is inherently transformative – but in 
producing the new we are also then destroying 
what was. This affords us interesting, transfor-
mative potentiality. We are not fixed but evolve 
– we are in constant flux. Crucially this creative 
potential is one of immanence; it is not imposed 
from outside. This becomes particularly impor-
tant when we recognize that Deleuze’s concerns 
are not just abstract philosophical thoughts but 
fundamentally political. Deleuze does not seek to 
understand the identity and limits of things, but 
seeks to understand their evolution. He proposes a 
notion of creativity that is not limited to that what 
we already know, and he frees us from struggles 
based on common sense and accepted values. In 
short it is a creativity that isn’t territorialized by 
the State or capital.
The discourse around creativity with which 
we are most familiar is different in kind to that 
conceived of by Deleuze. It operates precisely 
on the representation of an idea of creativity 
and what it can achieve. Furthermore it works 
for a particular order (the economic elite) and 
consequently its destructive nature is ethically 
problematic. For example, our creative impera-
tive is largely to sustain our capitalist societies, 
to facilitate production, to enable the lives of 
many to continue much as they have been or to 
see them ‘improved’ in such ways that these ‘im-
provements’ accord with capitalism. Underlying 
our idea of creativity is a representation of what it 
is, what (or who) it is for and how to go about it. 
These “representations” are precisely the concern 
of Deleuze in his critique of the image of thought.
Of course, on the one hand we can argue that – 
ultimately – not much really changes. As Jacques 
(1996) points out, we’ve been talking about 
the ever-quickening pace of change for over a 
hundred years. Yet on the other we can look at 
the local effects of this creative imperative, its 
association with the young rather than the old, 
and certain cultures to the exclusion of others. 
When industries change their working practices 
in fundamental ways many find themselves ob-
solete because they lack the skills or are simply 
surplus to requirements (Eagleton, 2004). Crea-
tivity and innovation is therefore not without its 
victims. As Bogue (2004: 35), taking a Deleuzian 
stance, notes: “Everywhere capitalism develops 
it undermines traditional social codes – kinship 
systems, religious beliefs, class hierarchies, 
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taboos, ritual trade relations and so on…” The 
link to capitalism is no accident. The current 
mantra for creativity is a concern of capitalism; 
creativity has been territorialised by capital. The 
dominant understanding of creativity is one of 
wealth creating change and innovation; its value 
is economic. This means that our problems (and 
solutions) are defined within this commonsensical 
understanding, and their consequences often fall 
outside of this logic. 
Schumpeter’s gales of creative destruction in 
the economy, and their adoption by neoliberal 
economists as a means to explain processes of 
industry change, have become accepted ways 
of understanding the inevitability and necessity 
for innovation. But these developments – even 
if they are to be seen in a positive light – do 
not benefit the many at whose expense they are 
achieved (Harvey, 2004). The dominant mode of 
creativity is one that renews capitalism in diffe-
rent forms, but does not pay heed to those who 
are damaged along the way (though of course 
this was not Schumpeter’s assumption, who be-
lieved that capitalism would be destroyed by its 
own success). And this drive is celebrated in the 
form of entrepreneurs, who are seen as the heroes 
and heroines of capitalism. The very people who 
maintain the capitalist machine are those who are 
celebrated as being deviant from it – the ‘creative’ 
thinkers. Yet here we might challenge that theirs 
are creative credentials.
Focusing on the necessity and inevitability of 
this representational form of creativity wi-
thout questioning it is what Deleuze calls us to 
question. That is not to argue that we should be 
against creativity – that would be foolish, and 
as Deleuze makes evident, in vain – but that we 
should consider the effects of what happens in 
the name of creativity, and to what extent this 
creative imperative is really about creativity at 
all. The Deleuzian approach to creativity enables 
possibilities and potentialities, it does not presup-
pose a creative machine that serves to occupy and 
maintain the territory of capital.
Common sense? Or “be the artist!”
“The conditions of a true critique and a true crea-
tion are the same: the destruction of an image of 
thought which presupposes itself and the genesis 
of the act of thinking in thought itself.” (Deleuze, 
2004: 175-176)
All of this leads towards his critique of the image 
of thought and its reliance on representation. Re-
presentation is essentially captured in the notion 
of common sense but this, Deleuze argues, is a li-
mited philosophy as it restricts our understanding 
and limits us to certain ways of thinking. This is 
best exemplified – by way of contrast – in his 
description of the artist. The artist, he argues (both 
in Difference and Repetition, and with Guattari 
in What is Philosophy?) seeks the new, rather 
than seeks to represent. In creating, the artist will 
be destructive, will affirm difference, and will 
exist in chaos. They will reach into the unknown 
and produce what is unrecognizable3. Art is not 
the means, Deleuze argues, of representing our 
experiences. It captures the prioritization of the 
senses: “We paint, sculpt, compose, and write 
with sensations” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 
166). This affirmation of difference is against or-
der and against established and recognised ways 
of working or method; it becomes nomadic. “Art 
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undoes the triple organization of perceptions, 
affections, and opinions in order to substitute 
a monument composed of percepts, affects, and 
blocs of sensations that take the place of lan-
guage. The writer uses words, but by creating a 
syntax that makes time pass into sensation that 
makes the standard language stammer, tremble, 
cry or even sing: this is the style, the “tone,” the 
language of sensations...” (ibid: 176).
Instead of the hackneyed phrase “be the change” 
Deleuze might instead suggest that we “be the 
artist”. But our tendency is to stick with habits, 
representations and what we know and Deleuze 
recognizes the challenges in shifting from this 
mode of thinking. Deleuze doesn’t suggest that 
his nomadic, minor science should exist at the 
expense of royal science. Indeed he sees royal 
science drawing from it. In this way he doesn’t 
look beyond capitalism, but sees potentiality wi-
thin it, by being affected by nomadic thought. But 
he doesn’t present us with an easy route to follow.
So, what does this mean for creativity and inno-
vation? It doesn’t mean that our current ways of 
working become redundant, but that we should 
appreciate their limitations by giving time to the 
untimely Deleuzian. 
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1. See the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index: 
http://index.gain.org
2. All italics in quotations are faithful to the original.
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ferent’ can become a recognisable form – when it is 
captured and imitated it loses its creative potentiality 
(Jeanes, 2006).
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Cet article s’appuie sur les travaux de Gilles Deleuze 
afin de remettre en cause le discours sur la créativité. Il 
a son origine dans l’attention toujours croissante portée 
à la recherche de solutions créatives et innovantes pour 
satisfaire les besoins et les désirs de la société, un récit 
devenu si omniprésent et un tel lieu commun qu’il 
risque d’être accepté sans discussion. On approfondit 
les idées de Deleuze qui indiquent que nous avons 
besoin de repenser ce que signifie être créatif et inno-
vant, et on interroge la territorialisation habituelle de 
ce discours. On examine les conséquences de cette 
rhétorique et de cette activité, en les reliant plus 
particulièrement à la politique et au capitalisme. Bien 
que Deleuze ne propose pas de réponse simple, sa 
critique de ce qu’il appelle l’image problématique 
(mais dogmatique) de la pensée met à mal nos hypo-
thèses et insiste sur la nécessité de considérer la genèse 
de notre pensée. En soulevant nous-mêmes la question 
de savoir d’où vient cette pensée, nous comprenons que 
bon nombre des problèmes que l’on essaye de résoudre 
et des valeurs en fonction desquelles nous travaillons, 
nous sont donnés « tout faits », ce qui nous conduit à 
travailler en fonction de ce que l’on sait et de ce que 
l’on reconnait. Ce qui inhibe notre véritable potentiel 
créatif et d’innovation.
Abstract
This paper draws on the work of Gilles Deleuze to 
question the discourse of creativity. Its motivation lies 
in the ever-growing focus on the need for creative and 
innovative solutions to address the needs and wants of 
society, a narrative that has become a ubiquitous and 
taken-for-granted ‘common-sense’ such that it risks 
an unquestioning acceptance of it. The paper explores 
the ideas of Deleuze to suggest we need to ‘rethink’ 
our understanding of what it means to be creative and 
innovative and to question the current territorialisation 
of this discourse. It reflects on the consequences of 
this rhetoric and activity, particularly relating it to 
the realm of the political and capitalism especially. 
Whilst Deleuze doesn’t offer any easy answers, his 
critique of what he calls the problematic (but dogmatic) 
image of thought poses challenges to our assumptions 
and stresses the need to consider the genesis of our 
thinking. By asking ourselves “from whence does this 
thought come?” we learn that many of the problems 
we seek to answer, and values for which we work are 
given to us ‘ready made’ and limit us to working for 
what we know and recognise. This inhibits our true 
creative and innovative potential. 
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